General thread for Neokantians, Hegelians, etc. and related studies. Zizek discussion welcome. Remember that philosophy proper started with Kant.
Main philosophers in chronological order:
- Kant (major)
- Fichte (minor)
- Schelling (moderate)
- Hegel (major)
Questions about German Idealism? Ask here.
Nobody? Self-bump, somebody's got to be interested in philosophy here.
I'm currently writing my MA thesis in philosophy, but I'm writing about Heidegger and Husserl and only touching upon Kant in relation to Husserl..
I did write a paper about Ernst Cassirer once though.
I'm starting to think if we're going to have something like this on /his/ we might have to expand the scope to continental philosophy in general. This board is filled with shitposts already...
I don't know (almost) anything about Fichte or Schelling or other guys that aren't Hegel and Kant. Anyone with too much time on their hands willing to write a quick explanation? Lets assume I know the basic Hegel stuff ( and Kant's).
for my thesis I'm using the early Heidegger (Being & Time) which I find very good. I find his interpretive turn of Husserl's phenomenology very interesting, but also confusing sometimes, like the distinction between the threefold ontological constitution of 'dasein' and the same threefold structure of care. I'm also fond of his 'what is metaphysics' and the related lectures.
I haven't read the later Heidegger, so I can't comment on that.
Alexandre Kojéve's 'Introduction to the Reading of Hegel' might help, albeit following in a 20th Century vein. Blackwell and Cambridge both have companions to Hegel, and the O.U.P edition of the Phenomenology has piece-by-piece analysis. There's plenty out there.
Fichte is the source of most generalizations about german idealisms
tl;dr he dismisses the noumena/phenomena distinction and insisting consciousness is grounded in nothing but itself, but also for self awareness to exist, other rational subjects need to exist to bring the subject of unconsciousness. he tried to bridge subjectivity into an intersubjectivity. also he was hella nationalist
I know fuck all about schelling except that weirdly enough, samuel taylor coleridge (who as it turned out was a german idealist) was obsessed with his works
Hume gonna have to slap a bitch?
Use Russon's Reading Hegel to quickly translate Hegel into plain english so you can learn his language and not waste time making elementary mistakes. When you have that much understanding use Hyppolite's Genesis and Structure to really pick him apart and see what exactly it is Hegel is responding to.
You can also just start with Hegel's History of Philosophy but even though it's not as obscure as the rest of his writings it's pretty fucking hard to make sense of his meaning without having adopted his language first.
Do you understand Stalin, Lukacs, Gramsci, Lenin, Marx, Hegel, Lacan, being an intellectual in a soviet-style society and post-soviet Yugoslavia?
Can you read Judith Butler? Because he's even trickier than Judith. Judith writes shit but wants to say simple things. Žižek writes simply but is behind 7 proxies of irony.
>tfw when russians have no appreciation for intellectuals whatsoever
Confirmed for not having read a single page of Schopenhauer.
Hegel didn't write to be understood, that's the whole problem with him. It's obscurist claptrap. Schopenhauer was the first philosopher in Germany to have enough balls to call bullshit on Hegel's pseudo philosophy
Typically when you want to counter an argument, you try to prove the contrary is true rather than give your opinion on two philosophers.
Not really. Philosophy and Theology is more closely tied to literature than history. Up to the enlightenment, I would argue most philosophers drew their ideas from Greek literature and the Bible than from society and politics.
>Žižek writes simply but is behind 7 proxies of irony.
His writing is comparatively direct, personally I find his materialist interpretation interesting, he's a worthwhile read for that, and a pretty important contemporary Hegelian.
People fail to realize that Hegel's enormous popularity both in German and elsewhere stems from his opaque thinking and generally pompous verbiage. His lectures were full to capacity, but it was not the kind of crowd you'd expect. Government officials, divinity scholars, low level businessmen, bureaucrats and journalists. In short, he appealed largely to people who had no serious grounding in philosophy.
No he has Leninist leanings but doesn't fit into any neat Communist orthodoxy believing that the past attempts were clear failures and a new formulation is necessary that learn dialectically from the past while admitting to not have any idea what that may be.
he adopts whatsoever opinion is the most controversial and thus gains himself the most press
he's argued about how "cool" it would be to live under an oppressive stalinist dictatorship, how Gandhi was more violent than hitler, how the nazis didn't go far enough etc etc etc
Others have already pointed to Kojeve and Taylor, who're very good and interesting.
Stanley Rosen has a few very good studies of Hegel: a general introduction to his philosophy that covers key topics in the Phenomenology and Science of Logic, and a book length study of the Science of Logic.
Peter Kalkavage also has a very good and very accessible introduction to the Phenomenology which I would strongly recommend for the complete neophyte.
The first half of Heidegger's Phenomenology of Spirit lecture course from the 30s is actually very accessible, and helps to place the Phenomenology with the rest of Hegel's work. The actual interpretation can be a little harder going, but Heidegger lets the text be for the most part. One of his most focused lecture courses.
As for Hegel's own writings, his lecture courses are pretty accessible (and important anyway). Between the Phenomenology, the Science of Logic, and the Encyclopedias, just work in order. How the whole System works out is confusing at first, and there is a way in which the Phenomenology and the Encyclopedia take on the Phenomenology differ, but that's part of an essential philosophical movement.
>be somewhat interested in philosophy
>educates enough to recognise Zizek is a bullshit populistic writer
>come here to know more about philosophy
>see Zizek mentioned along with Kant
Yeah, at least I tried to like your board.
Oh, so you've read his lectures, and can attest to their pompous verbosity?
Those lectures that are the most accessible writings in the Hegelian corpus, ja?
Schopenhauer was a whiny little bitch who wrote his polemics about Hegel after scheduling his lectures at the same time as Hegel's, and finding that no one wanted to go to them. Boo fucking hoo.
Besides, you can tell Schopy's bluffing when he speaks favorably of Fichte and Schelling, but it's *Hegel* who's got a problem with verbosity and obscurity of thought, as if the same couldn't be said of the former two.
>Remember that philosophy proper started with Kant
I think he meant GERMAN IDEALIST PHILOSOPHY began with Kant.
Should be something like:
"Remember, that philosophy properly started with Kant."
Oh yeah thanks man, going to be posting this one a lot
Schopenhauer blasted Fichte repeatedly in his works.
I bet you didn't even know Fichte had been a teacher to Arthur
The problems with Fichte's philosophy were relatively straightforward. Hegel's errors were more of a convoluted mess.
>less than nothing
Actually if you are well versed in the shit that Zizek likes to talk about, its easy to see his usefulness, he's more the kind of philosopher that speaks in aphorisms and is interested in provoking questions rather than providing answers, but its really only the tryhards who have a small amount of expertise and are anxious and protective over the small amount they understand that hate on him.
How much of actual philosophy do you know? have you read the greeks? the rationalists? the idealists?
Also, are you ready to have your mind raped by his text and ending up a mental patient?
Fucking good, this board seems like unredeemable shit but at least a few people acknowledge the existence of the greatest philosophical school of all time. I just started rereading the Phenomenology of Spirit and it's still pretty powerful stuff a year after my first reading.
a priori: a=a, something that is true without experience
a posteriori: a=b, something that must be justified by experience
A PRIORI/A POSTERIORI IS AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL DISTINCTION NEVER FORGET THIS
analytic: conceptually self contained, true in virtue of definition "all bachelors are unmarried men"
synthetic: adds or modifies the concept in question ." the sun is approximately 93 million miles from the earth", Not true in virtue of its own definition (its truth value depends rather on whether the proposition corresponds to the state of affairs)
ANALYTIC/SYNTHETIC IS A LOGICAL/SEMANTIC DISTINCTION
PEOPLE FUCKED THIS UP AND IT TOOK US LIKE 200 YEARS TO FIGURE THIS STUPID SHIT OUT
they are very similar but not the same. particularly because synthetic claims seem to necessitate empirical (experiential) verification and analytic claims seem to be self evident. there's also the necessary/contingent distinction which makes this shit even more fucking complicated
there are (or might be) instances of synthetic a priori justification.for example the claim that if something is red all over then it is not green all over. Belief in this claim is apparently justifiable independently of experience. Simply by thinking about what it is for something to be red all over, it is immediately clear that a particular object with this quality cannot, at the same time, have the quality of being green all over. But it also seems clear that the proposition in question is not analytic. Being green all over is not part of the definition of being red all over, nor is it included within the concept of being red all over.
furthermore there are analytic and synthetic claims that are not necessarily knowable.
hence a proposition(statement)’s being analytic does not entail that it is a priori, nor does a proposition’s being synthetic entail that it is a posteriori.
he in a sense has spiritual successors in the anti-realists (who insist that evidence-transcendent truths are not true and only provable claims can be considered true). check out Dummett's "The logical basis of metaphysics" an "Thought and Reality"
Nah, Nietzsche's system was metaphysical in the large sense, but instead of schopenhauers will zum lebens you have the will zur macht - an evolutionary force of self overcoming though not in the darwininan materialist sense. Nietzsche was largely a romantic, and repudiated atomism.
Transcendental idealism > subjective idealism
Berkeley denied the existence of an external world. Kant affirmed it, but claimed we could never have any knowledge of it. Schopenhauer inverted the properties of the phenomenal world to make the noumenon intelligible in negative terms. Nietzsche finally came along and said none of it fucking matters.
>implying Giacomo Leopardi didn't anticipate the wholesale rejection and destruction of metaphysics in the Zibaldone before Nietzsche was even born
>Schoppy called Leopardi his spiritual brother
>Leopardi was a hunchback manlet like Kant
He agreed with the basic precepts of idealism. See the first section of Human, All too Human, as well as his later notebooks.
He had the same physiologically grounded approach to metaphysics as Schopenhauer. Effect proceeds cause; cause is a fiction worked up by the brain and projected into space as object to ground the sensory effect, which meanwhile lingers as a kind of resonance until the intellect allows it to enter perception in a causal way.
Holy shit, i got confused again, care to explain a few points?
If i understood right, to a christian, the phrase "god exists" is "synthetic a priori"?
Synthetic can be "a posteriori", but how can you actually "prove" or "know" if anything "synthetic a priori" is true?
>the claim that if something is red all over then it is not green all over.
What if the there is a green underpaint on the object, then it is both "red and green" all over.
Can any analytic affirmation, proven right? i mean, where does the analytic knowledge comes from? the world? some kind of platonic extra-dimensional, metaphysical plane of ideas?
Kant attacks all the proofs of god in the critique of pure reason, but he also attempts to disprove the non-existence of god (yep its that fucking complicated) as his initiative is to draw boundaries on the possibilities of pure abstraction (derived non-experientially) so in a sense even disproofs of god are untenable because they can't exactly be confirmed or disconfirmed
whether or not there "are" synthetic a priori statements is a notorious controversy
synthetically a priori statements are logically true (such as he believed the statements of mathematics to be, like 7+5 = 12) because when analyzed in aristotlean subject/predicate terms , it would seem false to call 7+5=12 a priori analytic, because "equals 12" doesn't seem synonymous for 7+5 (and vice versa)(and he believed that a notion of multiple objects would entail some sort of notion of temporality which isn't analytic but a product of our continuous human experience) Gottlob Frege however requalified mathematics in complicated ways to state that mathematics was analytic a priori
further Kant also believed analytic a posteriori statements to be flatly contradictory (which is contested)
all of it can be contested based on what logical laws you hold or how you define "conceptual containment" or your epistemology
Kant doesn't posit that analytic truths are magic, (given that most of the things we talk about are ofcourse experientially derived), but he's talking about a realm where whatever we're claiming can essentially be substituted for the other claim and held true "all triangles have (only) three sides" is an analytic claim, but no doubt we've experientially derived the notion of "triangle" from sense experience (he's huge on space and time being boundary notions of our continuous experience) its much less magical than you think and kinda common sense. its to say of something that is, that it is.
(followup from >>50935)
there's an extremely famous paper by W V Quine called Two Dogmas of Empiricism where Quine attacks the whole notion of an analytic/synthetic distinction, largely on the basis of a definitional circularity of the notion of analyticity
to call claims analytic is in a sense to call them conceptually synonymous, but in order to define synonymy you'd end up having to define logical necessity, and then to define logical necessity you'd have to define analyticity.
it would be alright if you were class all analytic statements as logical truths and had a verification theory of meaning (if you held that only "verifiable" claims were meaningful)(extremely problematic for ten thousand reasons) but then Quine spends the rest of the paper murdering the dogma of verificationism
Nice reading comprehension; I said, after all, "speaks favorably of", which doesn't say anything about whether he critiqued their work.
Neither of you must be familiar with the following by Schopy:
"At first Fichte and Schelling shine as the heroes of this epoch; to be followed by the man who is quite unworthy even of them, and greatly their inferior in point of talent --- I mean the stupid and clumsy charlatan Hegel."
Strange, i was under the impression, W.V. Quine was a neopositivist.
Anyways, thanks for the detailed explanation, i think i need to go back to the back itself. It is thoroughly raping my mind. Would you recommend me any auxiliary reading of Kant for better understanding?
it critiques some hegelian notions (though the whole of european modernity as well) and he occasionally makes in-jokes about feuerbach and hegel and he quotes schiller, goethe, and bauer constantly. If you're familiar generally with the epoch and the german idealist movement in broad detail you should be able to get by
I assume you mean the ego and its own
its nothing some googling or a browse through the secondary literature won't be able to overcome
Heroes of a shitty epoch are still shitty
You must not be familiar with the cartoon praised by Schopenhauer, which depicts Kant ascending to heaven in a balloon while discarding all his worldly possessions (his wig, cane, frock coat, etc) . Down below, a group of monkeys is shown picking them up and trying them on.
he's commonly called a "post-empiricist" (because of his wholesale attack on the logical positivist movement
the schools of thought he's most commonly associated with are semantic holism (specifically confirmation holism, that theories or statements cannot be tested in isolation but only when embedded or against a web of other hypotheses or beliefs) though he's also famous for his "naturalized epistemology" which is that since philosophical approaches to scientific problems give us fuck all and scientific questions should be approached scientifically
btw most of these figures I feel I should add DO NOT reject science in any of its manifestations. what they're doing is reject ways we TALK about science (or whether we even can) given epistemic circularities and logical/empirical incompatibilities. only the occasionally fucktard will directly critique science and then set back public opinion about us a hundred years
How should we proceed with the threads? I don't like the analytic-continental split at all. But I feel something like 'philosophy general' would attract too many shitters by its vagueness. Thoughts?
"The Bounds of Sense" by P F Strawson is a no-nonsense analysis of Kant that's pretty top tier. Henry Allison's "Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense" is considered to be one of the richest expositions of the critique of pure reason in english.
the best version of the critique of pure reason is the cambridge edition, don't listen to any shit you hear about the penguin classics edition or the hackett edition being any better (more readable yes, but hella less accurate) one of the big doods in the kant scholarship behind the new cambridge editions, Paul Guyer, has a general text called "Kant" by routledge that's a good overview of all of his work
You did originally write
>but it's *Hegel* who's got a problem with verbosity and obscurity of thought, as if the same couldn't be said of the former two
implying that Schopenhauer did NOT say the same of Fichte and Schelling. This very much is a statement about
>whether he critiqued their work.
>Neither of you must be familiar with the following by Schopy:
I've read it - and what is it supposed to be? Tell me. One of those rare instances in which Schopenhauer compliments Fichte and Schelling?
In other passages, Schopenhauer did have some reserved compliments for Schelling and his school, like their search for what Schopenhauer calls "Ideas" and Schelling's description (but not citation) of the Kantian distinction between transcendental character and empirical character; I can't remember coming across even mild compliments for Fichte, though maybe there are some. But regardless, the quote you chose is not an example of Schopenhauer speaking favorably of either of them.
there's an oxford edition? wat
the cambridge edition is a huge ass blue version with Kant's sexy face on the front, designed for scholars and serious study
the hackett editions are minimalistic paperbacks that are usually extremely affordable, designed for undergrads
the penguin classics version is crap pumped out for penguin's general pseudo-intellectual audience, destined to gather dust on a bookshelf in a commercial bookstore
Then call it Romantic Era Philosophy. Ultimately it's semantics and you really shouldn't give a shit, but it sets a start date and end date without bringing up the Analytic/Continental conflict.
I would say no, as that risks bringing in hordes of Post-Modernists who are the greatest risk of shitting up the general, if anyone. If you want to be cheeky, you could call it "Pre-Post-Modern Philosophy General" and use OP pics of Romantic and Modernist philosophers so people understand we aren't going that far back.
That excludes some contemporary realist philosophers though. I guess it's best to add to the OP something warming against pomo subjectivism/relativism shitposting? And I agree with picture choice.
Been reading Bryan Magee's "The Philosophy of Schopenhauer" lately, so this argument is interesting to me. I'll try and offer something about Schopenhauer's relation to the Idealists without getting involve in the topic of personal spats.
Magee notes in his chapter on Schopenhauer and the Idealists that he shares a number of features in common with his former teacher, Fichte:
"1. What is primary and fundamental in the world is described as will — though of course the two philosophers use the word in different senses."
"2. The entire world of phenomena is seen as being the creation of this will."
"3. The act of creation involved is a 'free' act on the part of the will in the sense of being outside the domain of the principle of sufficient reason."
"4. Since this domain of natural causality is co-extensive with the domain of natural knowledge, of understanding and reason, and hence of intellect, then intellect is a creation of will, and is brought into being to serve its purposes."
"5. Man is not primarily a rational creature; what is primary in man is not reason but will."
"6. It is inherent in the very nature of the phenomenal world, constitutive of its being, that it obstructs, if not opposes, the willed activity of individuals."
"7. Morals and ontology are seen as two sides of the same coin, not unconnected as in Kant: the moral unity of the world, and the ontological and epistemological unity of the world, derive from the same source in such a way that the very existence itself of the world has a moral significance."
"8. The whole philosophy thus outlined is seen as being the natural next step after Kant's, and thus the fulfilment of Kant's work: it develops implications of his thought which he himself did not perceive; and where it differs from him it is more accurately seen as a correction of his errors than as a rejection of him."
With respect to Schelling, Magee notes:
"Like Fichte's, this philosophy of Schilling's has a number of striking features in common with Schopenhauer's. To say that Nature is visible Spirit looks to me suspiciously like saying that the phenomenal world is the perceptible manifestation of the noumenal.
Schelling and Schopenhauer both see the character of this phenomenal world as essentially evolutionary; both see the fundamental driving force of this evolutionary process as something which is not rational or mental; both see the goal of the process as being the achievement of self-awareness on the part of what exists; both see man as having been produced in the course of this process in order to serve the ends of the process; both assert an identity of inner nature between man and the natural world; both see creative art as the highest, or among the highest, of human activities, one that lets us look into the ultimate nature of what is (though in Schopenhauer's case music was thought of as being the only art that did this).
One can say that Schelling and Schopenhauer are in a class apart from all other well-known philosophers in the importance they attribute to art in the total scheme of things. By Schopenhauer's lights, Schelling's whole philosophy is superficial in that its application is largely within the world of phenomena — as indeed its label 'the Philosophy of Nature' implies — but, nevertheless, what the two philosophers have to say about this phenomenal world is, in all the many points I have just listed, similar."
With respect to Hegel, Magee makes a more interesting set of claims:
"In the case of Hegel, by contrast, what he had to say that is of real value is radically different from anything Schopenhauer had to say. Indeed, some of Hegel's most significant contributions to thought correspond directly to shortcomings in Schopenhauer's philosophy. This obviously helps to explain why Schopenhauer was so blind to their substance.
I have instanced already Hegel's grasp of the fact that the history of ideas is constitutive of all ideas, and the history of art of all art, an insight which Schopenhauer—passionate scholar though he was, and with a special reverence for the classics — surprisingly failed to absorb, despite the fact that he was lucidly aware not only that, but also how, the history of philosophy was constitutive of his own philosophy. (He even went so far as to cite the essentially historical character of Hegel's philosophy as an illustration of its valuelessness.)"
"Another important example of complementarity between the two philosophers is Hegel's understanding that, precisely because all aspects of culture and civilization are constituted by their own histories, they are all essentially social phenomena; and that one of the consequences of this is that the classical liberal conception of independent individuals coming together to form a society and to decide on its terms is profoundly uncomprehending. For the individuals are themselves largely constituted by society. Its language provides them with the very categories in terms of which they think, and everything about their outlook and values is historically and socially influenced. This means that the relationship of the individual to his own society is organic, not mechanical, and it means also that he has a special relationship to other members of the same society — he is like them on the inside, as it were; they are tissue of the same social organism — which is fundamentally different in kind from his relationships to members of other societies."
looking it up online I'm very skeptical. it looks extremely abridged (the critique of pure reason alone should be close to/more than 800 pages) and boasts including several of his other works which are all of varying lengths. if you're looking for a cheap edition of the critiques (because cambridge editions can be expensive af even in paperback) I think amazon sells the hackett editions of the 3 critiques (translated by pluhar) for like 10-30 dollars each
the cambridge editions are
the critique of pure reason (15-35$)
practical philosophy (45-65$)(contains not just the critique of practical reason but absolutely all of his ethical writings)
the critique of power of judgement (35-45$)
you could spend the rest of your life studying the critique of pure reason alone. seriously. you don't want to take reading it lightly. It was one of the first books I ever felt legitimately challenged reading and I doubt I still understand it properly (or maybe if anyone does), its subject matter is so broad but simultaneously important that Kant's project is often considered synonymous with the whole of the enlightenment. the whole of subsequent philosophy aftewards could possibly be considered just debate about kant's work (in the vein of that whitehead quote about all philosophy being a footnote to plato)
But anon, im so interested in Kant, ever since i´ve began studying philosophy, Kant remains the most intellectually stimulant philosopher i know. But im no genius, and im constantly plagued by a feeling im constantly misinterpreting him on every sentence. I take it very seriously, i don´t think i will ever stop attempting to understand Kant.
you might want to pick up "the prolegomena to any future metaphysics" too. When kant first published the critique of pure reason he was deeply upset by the lack of response to his work, and published a hyper-condensed, introductory text to the critique in a plain style (as plain as you can get when trying to reconcile Newton and Leibniz lol), kinda like Hume's failure with the treatise and subsequently his two "popular" enquiries
>nly the occasionally fucktard will directly critique science and then set back public opinion about us a hundred years
found the terrorist and yet claiming to be rigorous
>my face when people openly engage in Hegelry in public
>mfw a self-proclaimed "philosopher" thought he understood "the system" near me
Actually the Nation-State was birthed from Hegel. There's a reason why Hegel is considered the father of modern conservatism and nationalism. Also Fascist ideology is derived from him by Gentile.
Which is a shame, Hegel's system focused much on individuality and negativity which presupposed the destruction of this abstract and mere universal (opposed to the the subject) state, i.e. the death of Christ is also the death if the distant Jewish God.