>>7307826 That doesn't really answer my question, though, concerning Nietzsche's strawman of Christianity's perception of the material. That is, his idea of Christianity's perception of the material is foreign to Christianity, save in Gnosticism which really isn't Christianity.
>>7307859 he clearly doesn't. And his existentialism, critique of scientism, resentment and nihilism, are all taken from Dostoevsky's very Christian thought, I'd say Christians understand Nietzsche better than Nietzsche,.
>>7308488 apparently talking about an alternative jesus is already a sign of gnostic heresy to OP. the truth is that speculation about historical jesus and even the possibility of his fabrication became a central topic in 19th century german and french nonfiction.
>>7308488 By suggesting Christianity sees the material as bad. Christianity doesn't see the material as any worse than the spiritual realm, but corrupted (as was the Spiritual realm, by Lucifer's rebellions). Christianity sees the spiritual and physical as complementary, and man as God's unique creation because unlike the animals he is spiritual, and unlike the angels he is physical, a being of both realms, and therefore a binding of them together.
The Gnostic perspective is that the material realm is evil.
>>7308510 the first story of the bible makes sure that 99% of people will infer the opposite of what you wrote. sure, the gnostics are extra-pessimistic about this world. but it's only a gradual difference.
>>7308517 The first story of the Bible is about man's fall in the material realm. Satan's fall in the spiritual realm isn't related until the last story of the Bible. The first story isn't about how the material realm is evil at all: man fugged up his material condition, but he fugged up his spiritual condition just as much.
>>7308510 >The Gnostic perspective is that the material realm is evil. >Thinking gnostics subscribes the the good vs evil dichotomy Nice strawman, faggot. Gnostics saw the material realm as a bad, poorly designed place. It is a shadow compared to the world with the Aeon resides.
>The Valentinian Heracleon interpreted the devil as the principle of evil, that of hyle (matter). As he writes in his commentary on John 4:21, "The mountain represents the Devil, or his world, since the Devil was one part of the whole of matter, but the world is the total mountain of evil, a deserted dwelling place of beasts, to which all who lived before the law and all Gentiles render worship. But Jerusalem represents the creation or the Creator whom the Jews worship. . . . You then who are spiritual should worship neither the creation nor the Craftsman, but the Father of Truth."
>>7308524 the basic lessons are -nudity is bad mhkay [negative implications for sexuality intensify] -they are thrown out of fucking paradise, it doesnt take a Hegelian to work out the implications
ancient greeks already developed a shame of being naked, but only for women. male statues were always nude, it was considered heroic. romans turned it down a bit, but they also still had a normal relationship with their body unlike christians. when you look at byzantine and medieval art and sculptures, the body is always hidden under thick robes, their clothes function like a burka, reflecting a negative attitude towards body, hence not gnostic-exclusive.
>>7308559 Nudity is not bad per se, it becomes bad in the context of lust.
>[negative implications for sexuality intensify] Negative implications about *lust*, which is to sex as greed is to material goods.
>>7308559 Aye, yes, Christianity applied sexual mores to both sexes. Christ for instance brought to the West the idea of adultery in the sense of cheating on one's wife--before that, a *man* could only commit adultery by sleeping with someone else's wife, but it wasn't considered adultery to cheat on one's wife--it might make her jealous, Greek myths tells that much, but it wasn't considered adulterous.
All of this isn't about negative attitudes toward sex or the body, but rather negative attitudes toward our perversion of them in lust. There were plenty of Medieval depictions of Mary breastfeeding Christ, for instance.
Nudity is how God intended things for us, but we can't really have it without people deliberately working to incite lust with their body, and people lusting even when they don't. And it is lust that is a sin here, not nudity or sex per se.
>>7308546 >not knowing the difference between the good vs evil morality and good vs bad morality >oh but they used the word 'evil'(from a second hand account from a translation ...) so it counts The Gnostics saw 'evil' as an absence of good, not a quality of itself.Also from the man that you spoke of
>One other of his interpretations deserves mention. The meaning which the Greek of John 8:44 most naturally conveys is that of the pre-Hieronymian translation "mendax est sicut et pater ejus," and so it is generally understood by Greek Fathers, though in various ways they escape attributing a father to the devil. Hilgenfeld and Volkmar consider that the Evangelist shows that he embraced the opinion of the Valentinians and some earlier Gnostic sects that the father of the devil was the Demiurge or God of the Jews. But this idea was unknown to Heracleon, who here interprets the father of the devil as his essentially evil nature; to which Origen objects that if the devil be evil by the necessity of his nature, he ought rather to be pitied than blamed.
>>7308600 >The Gnostics saw 'evil' as an absence of good, not a quality of itself.Also from the man that you spoke of Right, that's how Christians see evil. Of course, because the Gnostics see the material as evil, that means they think the material is an illusion, and that is not a common view in Christianity.
>>7308602 No it isn't, animals have sex without lust.
>>7308614 Those aren't considered lust, theologically. Lust in theology is sex or desire for sex which is discordant with respect to the spiritual-physical harmony. In Catholicism, animals don't even have a soul, so they can't be discordant here anymore than rocks can't. In Orthodoxy, animals have souls (perhaps immortal), but they aren't spiritual creatures anymore than angels are physical creatures (angels, not being physical, have no sexual function), and since they aren't spiritual creatures, their sex can't be disruptive of a spiritual-physical harmony.
>>7308638 I didn't say Christians had the same idea, you did.>>7308638 I don't know that much about Christian morality and after seeing the bullshit theological gynsantics you pulled, I can't be bothered to argue with you about. But I wanna end off with if you accept what you just written in your post, then your OP is wrong coz nitzeche didn't strawman one for the other since there are both the same-ish
>>7308657 >They aren't How so? You just assumed Gnostics saw ther material plane as evil and I have already told it isn't and the gnostic you quoted did not even know all that his master, Valentinus knew, let alone speak for all gnostics( which is hilarious since they all have varying thoughts and approaches)
>>7308671 Uh, yeah. Marriage is a *sacrament* in Apostolic Churches (not in Protestant denominations, though). A "sacrament" is something that happens on both the physical and spiritual realm, and so when you marry, you are making an harmonizing spiritual-physical covenant with another person, in which sex can take place in which male and female, as complementary physical distinctions that God created to become "one flesh".
>>7308686 I know he's being dialectical, and dialect isn't strictly compatible with orthodox Christian theology. See "The Monstrosity of Christ: Paradox or Dialectic?"
>>7308696 Animals can't sin, so by theological definition, they can't lust. I'm not using "lust" in the secular sense, which sometimes applies to any and all sex drive. "Lust" in theology is specifically sinful sexuality.
>>7308728 >Animals can't sin, so by theological definition, they can't lust
Literally nobody cares about your definitions. What you're saying isn't registering and is superfluous entirely. I don't think you comprehend that most /lit/ users legitimately just don't care what you think.
>>7308822 yeahhhhhh but.... philosophy is philosophy
and that board's for philosophy
if you had an apple and were told to go through the right door would you go through the one that says apples or the one that says fruit? pretty philosophical question, maybe we should take this to >>>/his/ - you first im right behind u
>>7308800 i inspection shows that your ban appeal is an expression of egalitarian tendencies which nietzsche hated and your interpretation of "will to power" misunderstands the discursive dimension of nietzsche's concept. it is idealistic and not to realistic. prometheus brings fire, but he doesnt burn books.
Your mistake is in thinking that Nietzsche gives a rat's ass about engaging Christian doctrine, that's a job for weenies like Feuerbach. Nietzsche is strictly concerned with his diagnosis Christian psychology, not doctrine, and how its driven by an anti-materialist psychological impulse; he only cares about Christian doctrine when examining it as a symptom of the disease. Nietzsche would say Marxism is similarly anti-material, not based on Marxism's dogma, but upon its hatred of reality. Both harshly disdain this age. They love the material only where its an imaginary material world that will replace this one.
>>7307872 It's not. Nietzsche loved Dostoevsky because they had extremely similar thoughts. But you're getting warmer here if you want to object to Nietzsche: you can't combat his arguments against Christianity through doctrine, because that's not what Nietzsche is attacking. Your only resort is to confront Nietzsche's psychological analysis of Christianity and offer a counter analysis that holds more weight. Dostoevsky might be of some use to you here precisely because he was a psychologist-philosopher as great as Nietzsche, and he was an ardent Christian.
Debunking Nietzsche's psychology seems like a fascinating project for a Christian. Chesterton made some effort...it was shallow, but still decently constructed. You could work on a more in-depth attempt. I'm not Christian, though, so it's not something that would interest me personally as an endeavor, but I'd like to see your results if you ever give it a shot.
>>7307872 I don't think there has been a single Christian to understand Nietzsche. I have never seen a proper rebbutal to his central points.
Most rebuttals tend to be character attacks or focusing on minor details. Even this thread doesn't address the central points. Some of the attempts at rebuttals have been truly bizarre and end up taking quotes of context and interpreting them to mean something totally different. Nietzsche does not discuss whether the early Christians considered themself to be against the natural world (they were to some degree, especially the very early generation) but whether they were inspite of their own self-judgment.
>>7311428 >Chesterton made some effort...it was shallow, but still decently constructed. >All men who fail to have a softening of the heart, will have a softening of the brain. This is what happened to Nietzsche.
>>7311747 I suppose it is circular. It's not a very good job on my part, I'll admit. I definitely think Nietzsche deserves a proper rebuttal from Christian thought.
I will say that, as a Christian myself, I'm a huge fan of Nietzsche. I find him incredibly insightful and persuasive, and I think that, if you accept his premise that God isn't real and Christianity is false, sooner or later you have to admit that Nietzsche is right, and that he's probably the only one that's right. If Christ is not God, then we live in Nietzsche's world on Nietzsche's terms.
To this end I find him extremely useful in arguing with New Atheist types, with their claims of a Godless objective morality. They're as wrong as Kant was.
>>7311747 I don't think Chesterton is a great thinker, if that's what you're getting at, I think he was a pop thinker. I just admit he's the only one who made a fair attempt at rebutting some of Nietzsche's argument. He doesn't really achieve it, because Nietzsche substantiates his polemics with professional philology, whereas Chesterton is more superficial.
>>7311758 The closest to a Christian rebuttal to Nietzsche can be founded in the corpus of Dostoevsky, the OP was really on to something there. I'm surprised no Christian has made some effort to create a cohesive rebuttal from that, though.
“I dislike Nietzsche because he likes the contemplation of pain, because he erects conceit into a duty, because the men whom he most admires are conquerors, whose glory is cleverness in causing men to die.” ― Bertrand Russell
>>7311786 “The ape did not worry about the man, so why should we worry about the Superman? If the Superman will come by natural selection, may we leave it to natural selection? If the Superman will come by human selection, what sort of Superman are we to select? If he is simply to be more just, more brave, or more merciful, then Zarathustra sinks into a Sunday-school teacher; the only way we can work for it is to be more just, more brave, and more merciful; sensible advice, but hardly startling. If he is to be anything else than this, why should we desire him, or what else are we to desire? These questions have been many times asked of the Nietzscheites, and none of the Nietzscheites have even attempted to answer.”
>>7311779 Bertrand Russel is pretty much garbage regarding anything but mathematics, he reads like an opinion piece from a woman's magazine. Besides, he didn't even grasp Nietzsche, I don't think his mind was literary enough to.
>>7311790 Nietzsche started a nonsensical idea that men had once sought as good what we now call evil; if it were so, we could not talk of surpassing or even falling short of them. How can you overtake Jones if you walk in the other direction? You cannot discuss whether one people has succeeded more in being miserable than another succeeded in being happy. It would be like discussing whether Milton was more puritanical than a pig is fat.”
>>7311794 He [Nietzsche] condemns Christian love because he thinks it is an outcome of fear… It does not occur to Nietzsche as possible that a man should genuinely feel universal love, obviously because he himself feels almost universal hatred and fear, which he would fain disguise as lordly indifference. His “noble” man–who is himself in day-dreams–is a being wholly devoid of sympathy, ruthless, cunning, concerned only with his own power. King Lear, on the verge of madness, says: “I will do such things–what they are yet I know not–but they shall be the terror of the earth.” This is Nietzsche’s philosophy in a nutshell. --- Russ the Puss
I couldn't reply to your thread yesterday which had this as the OP:
>Concerning this 'war in heaven' (Rev. 12 :7) we have only cryptic references in Scripture; we are not told in detail what happened, still less do we know what plans God has for a possible reconciliation within the noetic realm, or how (if at all) the devil may eventually be redeemed. Perhaps, as the first chapter of the Book of Job suggests, Satan is not as black as he is usually painted. For us, at this present stage in our earthly existence, Satan is the enemy ; but Satan has also a direct relationship with God, of which we know nothing at all and about which it is not wise for us to speculate. Let us mind our own business.
It's amazing that he doesn't know this - Satan WANTS to be in hell, forever. Milton's "better it is to reign in hell, than serve in heaven" describes Satan's mind very well. Satan is an angel, a perfect intellectual being. He isn't like us who change our minds all the time. When Satan had the opportunity to rebel presented to him, he knew it would be everlasting, he knew he wouldn't change his mind because angels don't change their minds.
Satan spends every moment of every day in complete defiance and despair, with a lust to defile the soul of others. He works tirelessly to deceive others and bring them to hell. You don't think he deserves to burn forever for this? He has a formal and explicit hatred of God. Satan's hatred for God and for humanity is suffocating. I have felt it myself, I myself was given the opportunity to join him. I felt something of the pride and despair and hatred that he feels, and I knew perfectly well in my mind, that if I chose it it would be forever, that I could hate God forever out of pride. Now, if I can feel that way, if I can be that proud, then the devil can be so to almost infinite proportions, because he is practically infinitely more intelligent than I am and so understands his decision with almost perfect lucidity. This bishop doesn't know how abominable Satan is. Satan is the spirit that inspires men to kidnap and sacrifice virgins to him in vile ceremonies. There's a reason that he is called the "Beast". On one hand he considers himself infinitely superior to us fleshly creatures and abhors the flesh (Lucifer is the original gnostic), but at the same time he has a weird fascination for the flesh and for perversion; he loves to see men defiling their bodies because he loves to defile and corrupt God's creation. The whole point of Satan's existence is to try to prove to God that God made a mistake in his creation, that God does not deserve His place.
Chesterton didn't destroy shit. He made it clear that he didn't understand Nietzsche at all, and attacked a strawman version of Nietzsche, which is mostly because of his won inability (or unwillingness) to view anything in any way other than his own very close minded Christian worldview.
In his failed attempt at 'destroying' Nietzsche, he showed the central flaw of the pseudo-intellectual, namely the inability to imagine that you can be wrong on something. Then again, the whole notion of 'destroying' philosophies is intrinsically ridiculous and by using this phrase, you show that you suffer from the same flaw
>>7312524 As for Satan's conversation with God in Job, here is a similar conversation from recent times
>Exactly 33 years to the day prior to the great Miracle of the Sun in Fatima, that is, on October 13, 1884, Pope Leo XIII had a remarkable vision. When the aged Pontiff had finished celebrating Mass in his private Vatican Chapel, attended by a few Cardinals and members of the Vatican staff, he suddenly stopped at the foot of the altar. He stood there for about 10 minutes, as if in a trance, his face ashen white. Then, going immediately from the Chapel to his office, he composed the prayer to St. Michael, with instructions it be said after all Low Masses everywhere. When asked what had happened, he explained that, as he was about to leave the foot of the altar, he suddenly heard voices - two voices, one kind and gentle, the other guttural and harsh. They seemed to come from near the tabernacle. As he listened, he heard the following conversation:
>The guttural voice, the voice of Satan in his pride, boasted to Our Lord: >"I can destroy your Church."
>The gentle voice of Our Lord: >"You can? Then go ahead and do so."
>Satan: >"To do so, I need more time and more power."
>Our Lord: >"How much time? How much power?
>Satan: >"75 to 100 years, and a greater power over those who will give themselves over to my service."
>Our Lord: >"You have the time, you will have the power. Do with them what you will."
>>7312536 it's funny that Nietzsche is allowed to caricature St. Paul as a weak man full of resentment and is praised as an insightful and genius psychologist, but when Chesterton writes, accurately, that Nietzsche was a weak invalid with distorted views of humanity because of it, Chesterton is an idiot and pseudo intellectual.
Chesterton is right about the concept of "Superman". It is vague to the point of meaningless. All it expresses really is a kind of vague contempt for normal humanity.
That's because Nietzsche never tells you that his word in infallible. In fact, he encourages you to disagree with him. This lack of infallibility is also the main difference between the very real wisdom of Nietzsche and the pseudo-wisdom of orthodoxer-than-thou bores like Chesterton
all too human 1 §247 Cycle of the human race. >Perhaps the whole human race is only a temporally limited, developmental phase of a certain species of animal, so that man evolved from the ape and will evolve back to the ape again, while no one will be there to take any interest in this strange end of the comedy. Just as with the fall of Roman culture, and its most important cause, the spread of Christianity, there was a general increase of loathsomeness in man within the Roman empire, so the eventual fall of the general world culture might also cause men to be much more loathsome and finally animalistic, to the point of being apelike. Precisely because we are able to keep this perspective in mind, we may be in a position to protect the future from such an end.
daybreak §49 The new fundamental feeling: our conclusive transitoriness. >Formerly one sought the feeling of the grandeur of man by pointing to his divine origin: this has now become a forbidden way, for at its portal stands the ape, together with other gruesome beasts, grinning knowingly as if to say: no further in this direction! One therefore now tries the opposite direction: the way mankind is going shall serve as proof of his grandeur and kinship with God. Alas this, too, is vain! At the end of this way stands the funeral urn of the last man and gravedigger (with the inscription 'nihil humani a me alienum puto). However high mankind may have evolved - and perhaps at the end it will stand even lower than at the beginning! - it cannot pass over into a higher order, as little as the ant and the earwig can at the end of its 'earthly course' rise up to kinship with God and eternal life. The becoming drags the has-been along behind it: why should an exception to this eternal spectacle be made on behalf of some little star or for any little species upon it! Away with such sentimentalities!
Not when you consider that ethics is supposed to be applied to a very chaotic reality in which we know almost nothing and are often completely wrong about ethical judgments. Then it can be a very complex, and often very accurate view.
>>7312553 This is another point that Chesterton demolishes Nietzsche and the rest of modern intellectuals on. The false humility of, "you don't have to agree with me". It's complete bullshit. Every thinker is dogmatic by virtue of being a thinker, because you can't even begin to think before accepting certain principles on which to build. By writing you are by that very fact alone trying to convince people of your ideas. Writing in as persuasive manner as you can and then saying, "ah, but you don't have to agree with me" is just dishonest. It's the hypocrisy of the skeptic, "you don't have to accept what I say as dogma, except for the fact that there are no dogmas - that is my one and only dogma". That is dogmatic boredom. The skeptic is the most boring of all dogmatists, because his one dogma is a big zero.
>>7312559 >Not when you consider that ethics is supposed to be applied to a very chaotic reality
Reality isn't chaotic whatsoever. It's extremely ordered. If reality was chaotic I would have trouble getting out of my door. It's the fact that everything always obeys laws strictly that I even find reality intelligible.
>The false humility of, "you don't have to agree with me".
I didn't say that you don't have to agree with me, I said that there isn't a serious thinker who believes that his beliefs are infallible, and that by disagreeing with them, they are by default wrong. Don't put words into my mouth
>>7312574 Reality is absolutely ordered. Order and chaos cannot co-exist. If there is any chaos whatsoever in a system then the entire system is in a state of chaos. For any part of a system to be ordered the whole must be ordered.
The reason why we perceive "chaos" is just that we have incomplete knowledge.
>>7312560 as long as we found no archaic language that can map reality 1:1 without contingencies, one should remain self conscious of own fallibility. it isnt false humility but a necessary precondition to be taken seriously in modern world. otherwise you well be seen as a fanatic clown, maybe a curiosity belonging to the art world. anti-ironic intellectuals like Hegel and Kierkegaard could only exist before 20th century, when the knowledge of the world was still simple enough and left room for dogmatic optimism.
>>7312552 >Chesterton is right about the concept of "Superman". It is vague to the point of meaningless. All it expresses really is a kind of vague contempt for normal humanity. Chesterton never bothered to ask why Zarathustra was written the peculiar way it was. Zarathustra wasn't a treatise, and Nietzsche makes mention in almost all of his writings that he's using some deceptive elements for certain audiences. Attacking the superman is meaningless, because it's simply not central to Nietzsche. And, having ignored Nietzsche's sneaky style of writing, he ignores the implied relation between the superman and the eternal recurrence.
(Just so I'm being obscure about it, the tl;dr of it is that the eternal recurrence suggests that we are not to take the superman as a distant future possibility, but as something that's already been actualized numerous times in history, but which still needs to be striven for; everything else about it has to be garnered carefully from Nietzsche's details about it, and his comments in other writings about "philosophers", "legislators", etc.)
>>7312589 Reality is absolutely chaotic. Order and chaos cannot co-exist. If there is any order whatsoever in a system then the entire system is in a state of order. For any part of a system to be chaotic the whole must be chaotic.
The reason why we perceive "order" is just that we have incomplete knowledge.
>>7313494 >“Those who know that they are profound strive for clarity. Those who would like to seem profound to the crowd strive for obscurity. For the crowd believes that if it cannot see to the bottom of something it must be profound. It is so timid and dislikes going into the water.” ― Friedrich Nietzsche
>>7313513 Nietzsche isn't really obscurantist though, even if he were hiding secret messages. Going by that quote he's more talking about word-wizards like lacan where nobody knows what the fuck they're talking about, and take them as incredibly smart because of that.
>>7313483 It has nothing to do with whether it's good or bad; philosophy almost always (up until very recently, the change is most evident by the late 18th century) had a large rhetorical element.
Descartes's account of his discoveries in the Discourse and Meditations were by his own account in his correspondences strictly speaking parables and not historical accounts; Maimonides's Guide for the Perplexed openly acknowledges that he conceals his teachings in puzzles in order to make the reader work for acquisition of wisdom; Plato wrote dramatic dialogues; Parmenides's teachings are in epic poetic form and are dealt with as mythic; Spinoza's geometric form of presentation in the Ethics is explicitly said in his Improvement of the Understanding to *not* be a philosophical method; Leibniz in his correspondences makes it clear that his published writings are exoteric.
Just because he writes sneakily doesn't mean he has nothing to say, but it *does* mean that readers who notice such tricksiness need to read him more carefully, since his expressed doctrines might well have a strong rhetorical dimension to them that he might intend to mislead with (for example, the Will to Power, which on the surface sounds like a desire for brute strength and concrete power in the world; that partial take diminishes when you note that throughout Beyond Good and Evil, it turns out that even slave morality is an expression of Will to Power, which suggests that the "strongman" interpretation of the doctrine might not hit the mark in understanding it).
>>7313513 Sure; that doesn't say anything about *writing*, however. Those who know they are profound strive for clarity, but this is precisely an example of how he's a tricksy writer, because one must ask "clarity in what?" You seem to want to suggest off the bat that clarity would be expressed in writing, *but that itself is not clear*, whereas it seems more clear with his further example of the "crowd" that it's clarity in thinking that is the subject of that aphorism. There's nothing necessary about the philosopher being *open* about their thoughts when they express them publicly, and even Kant, in demanding that we only tell the truth, admitted in his correspondences that the demand doesn't require that we tell the *whole* truth.
>>7312524 That's an idea of Satan, not necessarily religious doctrine. It certainly sounds accurate, but that doesn't make the same as infallible dogma that we can say for certain in the way other doctrine is. That doesn't mean what you're saying shouldn't generally be accepted, just that it's not doctrine.
>>7314944 one thing is to use rhetoric in order to persuade the reader, but putting some kind of "sneaky trap" (i dont think there are any traps at all, i think that Nietzsche was just a careless, inconsisten motherfucker) in order to confuse the reader and make it look like there's some deep shit where there isnt is pure sophism
>>7315390 >one thing is to use rhetoric in order to persuade the reader Well, firstly, I didn't say they used rhetoric, I said that up until very recently in history there's always been a rhetorical component to philosophy.
Secondly, I didn't say that Nietzsche used "sneaky traps", I said he was a "sneaky writer", nor did I assert that he used his manner of writing to "confuse the reader".
You're seeing a contradiction where there is none, namely in thinking that writing to persuade means the same thing as writing honestly. Nietzsche, as I said myself at >>7314944, I suspect *does* want to persuade his readers, but philosophers who write esoterically like he does always noted that they had more than one kind of reader, and his manner of writing is meant to persuade these different classes of readers of different things. He says one thing to one class of readers in order to scare off those incapable of dealing with difficult subjects; he says another thing to the class of philosophers who know how to read carefully; and he says another thing to the class of readers most interested in him, the explication of which would require explication of his treatments of eternal recurrence, nihilism, and life.
That last class of readers are the usual high school fedora-tippers, and no one needs to accuse Nietzsche of presenting his work to them as if there a concealed depth, because they plainly aren't interested in the concealed depth, but the obvious and personally edifying surfaces (the "vulgar" interpretation of Will to Power, the "vulgar" interpretation of the Ubermensch, the critiques of religion and slave morality, and seeming encomiums of master morality, etc. etc.).
And you for your part, in approaching Nietzsche from the get go as someone who's already sophistical will not see anything in him, because you're already disinclined to read him carefully.
But as per the material I also noted in my last comment, your accusation could also well be leveled at the mass of philosophers throughout history, all of whom wrote to persuade different classes of people of different things. No one would deny that logic and argument don't have a place in the writings of figures like Parmenides, Plato, Maimonides, Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, but the fact that their work has such strong rhetorical dimensions *while still looking logical and/or thorough* suggests that their supposed arguments are themselves also rhetorical elements that conceal their actual arguments and observations.
Finally, you'd have to show how Nietzsche is careless and inconsistent in a way that doesn't beg the question; he himself writes about intending to be misunderstood, and supplies hints about his understanding of writings and reading, and you'd have to work out whether those suggestions, when applied to his corpus, necessarily result in his corpus making more or less sense than before.
>>7315528 >I said that up until very recently in history there's always been a rhetorical component to philosophy. what do you mean with "component"? vagueness or just purple prose?
>He says one thing to X, one thing to Y... what the hell? that some have a different interpretation doesnt mean that Nietzsche wanted to give two different ideas. The point of communcation is to express your thoughts. If you cant express youre thoughts clearly then communication has failed. And considering most of Nietzsches apologists often begin with "Youre misunderstanding Nietzsche" and often disagree with other apologists, it is hard to think that the guy expresses himself clearly.
>And you for your part, in approaching Nietzsche from the get go as someone who's already sophistical will not see anything in him, because you're already disinclined to read him carefully. i didnt say he was sophistical, i said that labeling someone as a "sneaky writer" to justify confusing the reader comes of as sophistical, since it makes it look like there's something "deep" where it isnt. I'd rather think that Nietzsche was careless or inconsistent as a writer than to label him as a "sneaky writer". I doubt the man would be happy with such label.
>your accusation could also well be leveled at the mass of philosophers throughout history maybe, but i dont see Platonists calling Plato a "sneaky greek" or Spinoza a "sneaky jew" (Pol gtfo). Most have a good idea on what these two meant, and build on their thought, while Nietzscheans are busy cleaning Niezsche of other Nietzscheans' "wrong interpretations" instead of building on his thought.
>you'd have to show how Nietzsche is careless and inconsistent in a way that doesn't beg the question yeah i know that. I wasnt trying to show that in the first place though
>he himself writes about intending to be misunderstood well that doesnt make any sense in the first place. Who wants to be misunderstood? How can you misunderstand Nietzsche and still give the man credit?
>what do you mean with "component"? vagueness or just purple prose?
Component, element. Philosophers have always taken up some concern with/for other people; if that wasn't somehow important to philosophy itself, we wouldn't have *any* philosophical writings. I gave examples at >>7314944 when I brought up the other thinkers. It's hard to say what the motivations were for someone like Parmenides, but from Plato on, it's clear that the presentation is important because philosophizing could get you killed, as Socrates life showed. Plato's dialogue format offers him distance from what's written, since, in the most technical way, "Plato" is never a character in his own dialogues, and so never speaks his own mind. Descartes' account of his revelation in the "heated room" (or "stove" in some translations) he explicitly admits in his correspondences to be a *parable*, and so it functions rhetorically as a tale to convince his readers of how his method would lead to knowledge. Maimonides makes it clear in his preface that he presents the material the way he does so that students of philosophy have to work hard for the insights, instead of taking on his opinions (and he also admits that its so the unworthy are denied access to them). Leibniz is explicit in his correspondences that his published works are exoteric, and he alludes to the esoteric manners of writing of Descartes and Spinoza approvingly, as a means of keeping from getting into trouble for having heterodox beliefs. Spinoza's Ethics uses the geometric form to persuade a certain kind of intellectual a few steps down from being a philosopher that his blatantly heterodox beliefs are rigorous (again, he says in the Improvement of the Understanding that the geometrical method is *not* philosophical, and he says in the Theological-Political Treatise that philosophical accounts must begin from an empirical natural history; these two texts of his both subvert the purpose of the Ethics. That scholars keep buying into the Ethics at face value suggests that their not especially astute readers of Spinoza, let alone astute thinkers.)
There's a rhetorical *component* to philosophy. That's simply it. Rhetoric is interested in persuading people; as an art, it informs as to what to say to what kinds of people. It doesn't advise that you should speak at all, nor does it insist that you state the whole truth plainly. Persuading people of something doesn't mean that I *necessarily* think that thing is true.
If you're still wary that this contention of mine is at all true of the philosophers throughout history, then the following link acts as something like a good empirical proof. It offers a pretty comprehensive set of direct testimonies of and about the philosophers concerning the concealment of one's thought, for whatever purposes, pointing to the rhetorical nature of their writings:
>>7315792 >what the hell? that some have a different interpretation doesnt mean that Nietzsche wanted to give two different ideas. The point of communcation is to express your thoughts. If you cant express youre thoughts clearly then communication has failed. And considering most of Nietzsches apologists often begin with "Youre misunderstanding Nietzsche" and often disagree with other apologists, it is hard to think that the guy expresses himself clearly.
Again, different interpretations are sometimes precisely the tool one uses for persuading certain audiences of one thing, and others of something else. Since this issue revolves around Nietzsche, here are relevant passages of his:
Nietzsche in the Nachlass of 1885-1886 says that "it is today necessary to speak temporarily in a coarse manner and to act coarsely. What is fine and concealed is no longer understood, not even by those who are related to us. That of which one does not speak loudly and cry out, is not there."
In the Nachlass of 1882 he says that "to speak much of oneself is also a way of hiding oneself."
These two privately written passages are reflected sometimes in his published writings, such as in Beyond Good and Evil:
270. "The intellectual haughtiness and loathing of every man who has suffered deeply—it almost determines the order of rank HOW deeply men can suffer—the chilling certainty, with which he is thoroughly imbued and coloured, that by virtue of his suffering he KNOWS MORE than the shrewdest and wisest can ever know, that he has been familiar with, and "at home" in, many distant, dreadful worlds of which "YOU know nothing"!—this silent intellectual haughtiness of the sufferer, this pride of the elect of knowledge, of the "initiated," of the almost sacrificed, finds all forms of disguise necessary to protect itself from contact with officious and sympathizing hands, and in general from all that is not its equal in suffering. Profound suffering makes noble: it separates.—One of the most refined forms of disguise is Epicurism, along with a certain ostentatious boldness of taste, which takes suffering lightly, and puts itself on the defensive against all that is sorrowful and profound. They are "gay men" who make use of gaiety, because they are misunderstood on account of it—they WISH to be misunderstood. There are "scientific minds" who make use of science, because it gives a gay appearance, and because scientificness leads to the conclusion that a person is superficial—they WISH to mislead to a false conclusion. There are free insolent minds which would fain conceal and deny that they are broken, proud, incurable hearts (the cynicism of Hamlet—the case of Galiani); and occasionally folly itself is the mask of an unfortunate OVER-ASSURED knowledge.—From which it follows that it is the part of a more refined humanity to have reverence "for the mask," and not to make use of psychology and curiosity in the wrong place."
>>7315799 290. "Every deep thinker is more afraid of being understood than of being misunderstood. The latter perhaps wounds his vanity; but the former wounds his heart, his sympathy, which always says: "Ah, why would you also have as hard a time of it as I have?""
So, he's an esotericist, willing to speak loudly and extravagantly on behalf of some philosophical end. Part of the hint of his real position is provided in BGE in his only two aphorisms about Dionysus, suggesting he's actually a partisan of Plato.
7. "How malicious philosophers can be! I know of nothing more stinging than the joke Epicurus took the liberty of making on Plato and the Platonists; he called them Dionysiokolakes. In its original sense, and on the face of it, the word signifies "Flatterers of Dionysius"—consequently, tyrants' accessories and lick-spittles; besides this, however, it is as much as to say, "They are all ACTORS, there is nothing genuine about them" (for Dionysiokolax was a popular name for an actor). And the latter is really the malignant reproach that Epicurus cast upon Plato: he was annoyed by the grandiose manner, the mise en scene style of which Plato and his scholars were masters—of which Epicurus was not a master! He, the old school-teacher of Samos, who sat concealed in his little garden at Athens, and wrote three hundred books, perhaps out of rage and ambitious envy of Plato, who knows! Greece took a hundred years to find out who the garden-god Epicurus really was. Did she ever find out?"
At 295 he says:
"In the meantime, however, I have learned much, far too much, about the philosophy of this God, and, as I said, from mouth to mouth—I, the last disciple and initiate of the God Dionysus: and perhaps I might at last begin to give you, my friends, as far as I am allowed, a little taste of this philosophy?"
So Plato and the Platonists are flatterers of Dionysius, which has the double meaning Nietzsche offers: 1) flatterers of the tyrant, and 2) actors (read: esotericists). On the latter bit about actors, consider this passage on masks:
>>7315804 40. "Everything that is profound loves the mask: the profoundest things have a hatred even of figure and likeness. Should not the CONTRARY only be the right disguise for the shame of a God to go about in? A question worth asking!—it would be strange if some mystic has not already ventured on the same kind of thing. There are proceedings of such a delicate nature that it is well to overwhelm them with coarseness and make them unrecognizable; there are actions of love and of an extravagant magnanimity after which nothing can be wiser than to take a stick and thrash the witness soundly: one thereby obscures his recollection. Many a one is able to obscure and abuse his own memory, in order at least to have vengeance on this sole party in the secret: shame is inventive. They are not the worst things of which one is most ashamed: there is not only deceit behind a mask—there is so much goodness in craft. I could imagine that a man with something costly and fragile to conceal, would roll through life clumsily and rotundly like an old, green, heavily-hooped wine-cask: the refinement of his shame requiring it to be so. A man who has depths in his shame meets his destiny and his delicate decisions upon paths which few ever reach, and with regard to the existence of which his nearest and most intimate friends may be ignorant; his mortal danger conceals itself from their eyes, and equally so his regained security. Such a hidden nature, which instinctively employs speech for silence and concealment, and is inexhaustible in evasion of communication, DESIRES and insists that a mask of himself shall occupy his place in the hearts and heads of his friends; and supposing he does not desire it, his eyes will some day be opened to the fact that there is nevertheless a mask of him there—and that it is well to be so. Every profound spirit needs a mask; nay, more, around every profound spirit there continually grows a mask, owing to the constantly false, that is to say, SUPERFICIAL interpretation of every word he utters, every step he takes, every sign of life he manifests."
Now, Nietzsche throughout the first part of BGE seems to suggest that *most* philosophers were esotericists. That he picks out Plato and the Platonists in the only passage containing any reference to Dionysus (where the "actor" gloss is a direct reference to the god and not the tyrant with the slightly different name) seems crucial. These passages taken together with above quoted passages about provoking misunderstandings of his work suggests that with respect to the work being done in BGE, it's Plato who stands as a kind of paradigm.
Now as for the qualified disagreements, consider how the preface is worded:
"the dogmatic philosophy was such a mask; for example, the Vedanta doctrine in Asia and Platonism in Europe."
>>7315806 Again, consider his passage about masks along with that. He goes on to criticize Plato, but he prefaces it with the statement: "Let us not be ungrateful to it"(!) We should also take note that for Nietzsche, Plato is "the most beautiful growth of antiquity".
He also stresses the difference between Plato and Platonism somehow:
But the fight against Plato or, to speak more clearly and for "the people," the fight against the Christian-ecclesiastical pressure of millennia—for Christianity is Platonism for 'the people'..."
Now, for Nietzsche's critique in the preface, we should note what his criticism *doesn't* say:
"the worst, most durable, and most dangerous of all errors so far was a dogmatist's error—namely, Plato's invention of the pure spirit and the good as such."
It's Plato's pure spirit and the good as such are criticized as *inventions*, not as falsehoods. This points to the passage again at aphorism 7, regarding Plato as an actor.
Somehow, it seems important to Nietzsche to present himself as undoing Plato, while really doing something similar. The ideas are different, but the desired trajectory seems to be the same (i.e., the move from the Philosopher to the dogmatism, such as Neoplatonism, to the religion, namely Christianity). Note how BGE is divided; the topics of philosophy and religion seem to belong together in the first half.
>>7315809 >I'd rather think that Nietzsche was careless or inconsistent as a writer than to label him as a "sneaky writer". I doubt the man would be happy with such label.
I think by now, after everything I just quoted and explained above (especially the first passages of >>7315799 and >>7315804), that your latter contention would be untrue. Nietzsche, I'm sure, would've been excited at the prospect of someone reading him carefully enough to come to the conclusion that his manner of writing is sneaky.
>maybe, but i dont see Platonists calling Plato a "sneaky greek" or Spinoza a "sneaky jew" (Pol gtfo). Most have a good idea on what these two meant, and build on their thought, while Nietzscheans are busy cleaning Niezsche of other Nietzscheans' "wrong interpretations" instead of building on his thought.
As per the pdf linked to at >>7315792, that's not really the case. With Plato, scholarship has been incredibly fragmented almost the entirety of the last century, with huge arguments over whether the dialogues show his "development", whether the Socrates depicted is "historical" and whether that's even relevant, and what to make of his dramatic format. Spinoza, scholarship has admittedly come to more of a consensus on, but as per what I pointed to about the Ethics at >>7315792, I'm pretty confident that that consensus is actually outright wrong.
>yeah i know that. I wasnt trying to show that in the first place though
I didn't say you were, which is why I said that in order to support your own preferred explanation of Nietzsche's manner of writing (careless, inconsistent, etc.), you would *have* to. Your explanation wouldn't have any ground otherwise.
And I mean, even just with respect to Nietzsche as a person, he was a trained philologist, that is, a *close reader*. (This comes up in the preface to his book Daybreak, where he refers to it as the art of slow reading.) His education trained him to compose and read carefully; why would you more readily assume that he was so sloppy that any 4th grader could refute him?
>well that doesnt make any sense in the first place. Who wants to be misunderstood? How can you misunderstand Nietzsche and still give the man credit?
I should hope that it's at least comparatively more clear after my above posts that this is in fact the case. There's a history of esotericism of this precise kind called "Philosophy Between the Lines" by Arthur Melzer that offers a detailed account of how it worked, and some of the common reasons for it. It's very accessible too.
And the trick isn't to mislead completely, such that there really truly is *no point* to reading him. The point is to tread carefully, compare passages, consider the surrounding subjects, see how he treats of a topic in a different book, consider his different modes for his different books (aphorisms vs. mythic stories vs. poems vs. polemics). I mean, Christ, philosophy's a lot of work. Would you prefer that there was no effort?
The three books I'd point to are the two studies that Laurence Lampert wrote on Zarathustra and Beyond Good and Evil ("Nietzsche's Teaching" and "Nietzsche's Task") and Stanley Rosen's study of Zarathustra, "The Mask of Enlightenment".
There are a number of articles in the political philosophy journal Interpretation on Nietzsche that can be read for free in pdf format (just ctrl+f the page and search for Nietzsche to see which ones are relevant):
As non-scholarly but accessible examples of these kinds of close readings, you can check out the following blog that contains some accessible close readings of select passages:
And this site that offers remarks on Nietzsche's comments on Beyond Good and Evil in Ecce Homo, a detailed commentary on the first chapter of Beyond Good and Evil, and an interesting close reading of passages from two Platonic dialogues that correspond very well with Nietzschean doctrines:
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