How does Hegel's "Lectures on History of Philosophy" differ from Russell's "Hisory of Western Philosophy" in terms of biases and understandings? I just started reading the first in the three set volume published by Bison Books.
So you are saying that there is nothing of a philosophical nature in the works of Pynchon, DFW, Joyce, Nabokov, Dostoevsky, Melville, Faulkner, Hemingway, Wilde, Proust and other authors of fiction? I was not aware of this.
Also, what sort of chemical compounds do I need to ingest to become as stupid as you?
Do you really think so? He doesn't do any analysis he just wraps them in his own narrative.
The thing about Russel is he might be an idiot with regard to some philosophers but his treatment of the subject is dedicated, he assess claims that philosophers make and then he counters them with claims of his own showing the relevant logical interplays then for the reader points out that this would not be the end of the debate and that philosophy is all about this debate.
Hegel has good works but his history is fucking silly, especially when dealing with Hume.
So you are looking for a philosophical debate then?
They both have a historicist tendency (it's all the more surprising in Russell, since that doesn't seem to fit the mode of analytic philosophizing; he takes it as obvious that all of the philosophers were completely determined by their time and place, which, if applied to Russell's beloved analytic mode, doesn't bode well for it).
Hegel was much more devoted to the study of the figures he read than Russell, who, for all of his brilliance in formal logic and mathematics, was always sort of half-hearted about the philosophers before him, excepting Leibniz.
Both of them have biases in their account, for largely similar reasons. For Hegel, human history moves in accordance with the dialectic of spirit: every figure necessarily results in the next dialectically. The relations between thinkers are definite. Hegel's system makes a kind of claim to have moved beyond love of wisdom to wisdom itself, and so the figures in the history of that movement are all viewed in retrospect to how they helped that movement along. Understanding of them is necessary to understand wisdom itself. For Russell, all of the figures are to largely be evaluated primarily by the logic and math of his day, which he takes to not be differences in understanding, but as definite progress that refutes the older thinkers, and they're evaluated secondarily by the kind of British liberalism of his day, both politically and ethically.
Having read both of them, for my part I really do prefer Hegel's history, since his treatments are much more careful and full and interesting insights you'd otherwise miss on these thinkers, while Russell kinda dismisses most of them. Russell's book is meant to be entertaining and to bring in some money and show off the results of analytic philosophy when compared to the other great figures. Hegel takes the more complicated route of saying that they're wrong, but only because their stances are partial, and that they aren't wrong in some wholesale way; they all show *something* of the truth, even in their partiality, and those partial moves were necessary for philosophy.
Ultimately, Russell's take depends on unconscious Hegelian assumptions about historical progress that he seems unaware of; I'm not sure that's so surprising, since he was a British Idealist for a decade (something like third-hand experience with Hegelian ideas). His take on Hegel is pretty dumb.
awesome, this is exactly what I wanted. I did try to make a thread on /his/ but it only got one reply saying that /his/ was shit and then the thread died. So there you have it.
Do you remember if some Hegelian vocabulary was necessary for his lectures on the history? For example stuff like being-in-itself and being-for-itself, etc
As far as his vocab is concerned, it's in there, and I expect that he still has a technical use for those terms, but the text is absolutely not flooded with them, and the lectures (students notes and transcripts, I believe?) are incredibly accessible. Like, a quick look through the text I just did presented me with a few appearances of Notion (or Concept), I saw the line "Man is Mind (or Spirit)" somewhere around the beginning, and stuff like that will be helped by knowing his vocab, but Id say it's not really necessary, or anything to worry about. Again, the lectures are very accessible.
I'm going through the introduction and it's mostly easy but some of it is difficult. Here's a part where I am having difficulty,
He is explaining what the meaning of the word "reason" is,
"What is the real meaning of this word? That which is in itself must become an object, to mankind, must arrive at consciousness, thus becoming for man. What has become an object to him is the same as what he is in himself through the becoming objective of this implicit being, man first becomes for himself; he is made double, is retained and not changed into another."
In the link above there is more context. I think I need to get a hang of his terminology here. So he's saying that reason as a potential must become an object, to arrive at consciousness, and become actualized. Reason becoming actualized is what he is in himself (what his implicit potential or capacity is to become manifest), and in that becoming manifest, he is made double - both his implicit nature remains and his actual, aka being-in-itself and being-for-itself? I'm just trying to sub when he says "in itself" or "for itself" for potential/actualization respectfully.
It does seem like this kind of talk is more in the introduction than in the rest of the work but I would like to understand this. I tried looking in some Hegelian dictionaries which cleared up some of the terms but I am still not sure what he's trying to say about reason.
I'm also not sure when "in itself" just means "in itself" and when it means "in its potential/capacity but not actualized form". So he could be saying something as simple as, when something becomes an object, it must become an object in your mind through reason, and this capacity of reasoning is what makes you yourself.
I think this is similar (in term of the dialectic) of the awareness that the unhappy consciousness has of the 'Unchangeable' in the PoS: the self has two ways, who are not rigid in themselves but move, to relate to the truth: first as a flux of concrete and passing happening with no stability whose fate is to be sublimated by the Ego, which will create a mirror-image, a fixed and stable essence that will be a moving force that at the same time destroys the objective and vanishing world.
Reason here I think is just that conceptual significance we inherently attribute to the vanishing and confusing medium of external 'happenings', in the second place, that presupposed reason, to not be an abstract and unreal reality, will put itself to test against that otherness, know itself there, and return as a new 'reason'.
I think is both, something can be 'in-itself' by a continuous alienation, or self-emptying of that thing into a medium of otherness, stops being merely in-itself and is now a being-for-another, ONLY after this movement of being-for-another can a thing be in-itself.
See, I can infer some meaning if I think about Hegel's other works and ideas. But I can't make sense from his sentences there alone what it is supposed to be. He's doing a lecture, right, and he's just gotten done explaining to these kids what he means by for-itself and in-itself, about a paragraph up. What are they supposed to make of what he's saying right here?